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“Fight for liberty! In the 17th Chapter of St. Luke it is written: ‘the Kingdom of 
God is within man’—not one man nor a group of men, but in all men! In you! 
You, the people have the power—the power to create machines. The power to 
create happiness! You, the people, have the power to make this life free and 
beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure. Then, in the name of 
democracy, let us use that power! Let us all unite!” 
 Charlie Chaplin in the movie “The Great Dictator” (1940) 
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1.  Introduction: Why Democracy Is Vital 
 
In the same year that Pim Fortyun took the Netherlands by storm with his populist 
approach towards politics and changed the Dutch political landscape forever, 
Holsteyn and Mudde (2001) completed a book entitled Democracy in Decline? They 
asked several scholars with ties to the Netherlands to write on varying topics 
regarding the status of Dutch democracy: is it in decline? An interesting contribution 
in this book is from Herman van Gunsteren. He believes that the quality of democracy 
is declining in the Western world because the business of politics is becoming more 
and more isolated from the public sphere. He argues this isolation is due to three 
developments. First, technocratic efficiency considerations are replacing political 
deliberation. Second, citizens are increasingly apathetic towards politics. Third, 
politicians are increasingly ashamed of their jobs, more than ever before (Van 
Gunsteren, 2001: 31). These developments pose a real threat to democracy, which is 
at risk of becoming irrelevant, and crumbling down (Van Gunsteren, 2001:31). When 
people live together, there will always be conflict and there will always be politics to 
harness it. Politics is an inherent societal feature and will always be a part of the 
human experience. When politics is reduced to the shadows it will not stop to exist, 
van Gunsteren argues, it only becomes less accountable (Van Gunsteren, 2001: 31).  
 
Democracy is not something that is given, and contrary to politics it can 
perish. We need democracy as a safeguard against the tyrannical use of political 
power, without democracy itself becoming a tyrannical tool for the majority to 
oppress minorities. If we truly believe in the liberal principles of free and moral equal 
citizens, one cannot tolerate a decay of liberal democracy. We live in times where 
overwhelming wealth and freedom have rendered democratic participation 
unimportant in the eyes of many citizens. But we also live in times where moral 
conflicts still continue, often in new forms due to several factors such as globalization, 
digitalization and the growing ethnic diversity of our societies. We need politics more 
than ever. We need democracy more than ever. Above all, we need citizens to 
understand what it means to live in a plural liberal democracy. But we live in times 
where the democratic experience of citizens in the Western world has decreased 
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steadily, and where toleration and respect towards the freedoms of others is waning.  
    
In this thesis, I emphasize the need for deliberation in the public sphere in 
order to settle moral conflicts and reach compromise among citizens. We need a 
society that fosters political participation among its citizens and also a sense of civic 
responsibility. Politically active and politically aware citizens that deliberate in the 
public sphere are necessary to keep liberal democracies healthy.    
 One way to foster political participation is by introducing a policy of 
compulsory attendance during elections. Not only does that help legitimize 
governmental policies, it also facilitates a form of active and responsible citizenship 
that is crucial in keeping liberal democracies healthy. My main goal in this thesis is to 
justify a policy of compulsory attendance.    
 Specifically, I offer two arguments in favor of compulsory attendance.  The 
first argument argues that liberal principles mandate it.  This is in sharp contrast to 
how most liberal theorists view compulsory attendance; they normally criticize it 
sharply precisely because it supposedly fails to accord with liberal principles. But I 
argue that, in fact, liberal principles mandate compulsory voting for sustaining a 
flourishing and just liberal democracy.       
 The second argument I offer is an endorsement of Lijphart’s argument that 
modern democracies suffer from undemocratic tendencies that can be partly fixed by 
a policy of compulsory attendance. 
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2.1 Liberal democracy        
                        
The predominant political form states take in the Western world is that of a liberal 
democracy. Erroneously it is often stated that what separates free political regimes 
from unfree ones is the presence of democracy. This statement is only partly correct, 
depending on how democracy is understood. In its essence “democracy” is about 
popular sovereignty. This is the idea that laws should be made by those to whom they 
apply (Post, 2005: 24). The reign of popular sovereignty is hardly sufficient, however, 
to make a society free.  The idea that democracy assures a free political regime arises 
because the concept of “democracy” in the Western world is usually understood much 
broadly than in its bare procedural terms. Democracy in our society is also a term 
associated with substantive ideas and values about freedom and equality (Post, 2005: 
23). It is much more than an instrumental process to reach a majority. In order to 
avoid confusion, I from here on understand liberal democracy as referring to a system 
based on both popular sovereignty and liberal values.            
 Liberal political philosophy refers to an extensive set of philosophical 
doctrines that, although they sometimes conflict, are at their core all premised to some 
extent on the notion that individuals ought to be autonomous and that they are morally 
equal. At the institutional level, this notion translates into the idea that citizens should 
be guaranteed a basic set of liberal rights that are to be protected by the state. Which 
specific rights this set should contain is a highly contested matter, but all liberal 
democrats acknowledge that there is such a basic set of rights and that these should be 
respected regardless of what the circumstances are.      
 All liberal democracies protect a basic set of rights, though they differ with 
respect to what rights are included.  To make this abstract idea more concrete one can 
think of the famous ”Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, which all western 
liberal democracies have signed. In this declaration, states vow to protect, for 
example, “the right to freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial when charged with a 
crime, the right not to be tortured, the right to engage in political activity” and a right 
to education (Nickel, 2010).  
Such rights are usually protected by a body of law under which the citizens of 
a political regime reside. The two basic ideas, as contained in “The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” are that all individuals are morally equal and 
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autonomous moral beings. So every individual, in theory, has equal claims on these 
rights that protect their freedom. These rights also hold that individuals have rightful 
claims on important tools that allow them to effectively act upon that freedom, like 
the right to an education. Effectively acting upon ones right to freedom is more 
concerned with what has been labeled individual autonomy. The right to an education 
does not immediately increase one’s freedom in a negative sense, but hands 
individuals a tool with which they can develop themselves and thus increases their 
autonomy.    
The latter half of the term “liberal democracy” implies that its citizens 
collectively come to shared decisions about a wide range of subjects concerning 
governmental policies and the laws to be made. This decision-making process in 
Western liberal democracies usually takes the form of parliamentary representation. 
Although democracy and liberalism are two different philosophical doctrines, in 
Western popular culture they are hardly separated when discussed. “Democracy” in 
the Western world is usually understood as more than popular sovereignty alone. That 
is, it is understood as more than a mere process to reach majority decisions. In the 
Western world “Democracy” became a theory also grounded upon substantive ideas 
and values about freedom and equality (Post, 2005: 23).  
Though democracy and liberalism are closely associated in the mind of the 
public, they are separate philosophical doctrines.  Theoretically, the former does not 
imply the latter and vice versa.  Nevertheless, the close association between ideas of 
popular sovereignty and liberal rights is hardly entirely philosophically unwarranted.  
If one takes the liberal values of autonomy and moral equality serious, democracy is a 
natural next step. Moreover, as we will see later on, democracy is also an instrument 
to preserve basic liberal values.      
 There is, however, a tension between liberalism and democracy. What if 
democratically a collective body under one law decides to scrap the liberal rights of 
certain minorities? When democracy is explained solely in an instrumental way, a 
polity could be democratic, though illiberal. Vice versa, a society can be liberal but 
undemocratic. In its core the ideal of a liberal democracy holds that a society ought to 
respect the rights of individuals, and together come to shared decisions through a 
democratic process. In some cases there will be a tension between majority decisions 
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and the liberal rights of individuals. When it comes to crucial basic rights such as the 
right not to be tortured and the right to a fair trial, these rights are to be respected but 
for perhaps extraordinary circumstances. In many other cases there will remain a 
tension between upholding liberal values and coming to collective decisions. Much of 
this arises because people do not have the same convictions. Liberal democracies 
inherently are bound to be pluralistic.   
So although democracy and liberalism are closely connected, there is also a 
tension between these doctrines that perhaps cannot be resolved, but rather should be 
embedded properly. In the remainder of Part II, I elaborate on what I believe is the 
best structure for embedding this conflict.  Although I come back to the topic of 
liberal freedom later on, I have to make some preliminary remarks on the subject of 
autonomy and freedom, in order to introduce the problem of pluralism. 
 
 
2.2 Liberalism and the freedom to pursue one’s own moral convictions  
Liberals espouse a wide variety of sometimes conflicting doctrines. But what binds all 
of them together is a commitment to the value of liberty (Gaus and Courtland, 2011). 
Liberals differ widely in their interpretation of the concept of liberty and its origins, 
but none of them dispute that liberty is the basic value to be respected. Even political 
liberals, who try to create a framework for political compromise without trying to 
make any substantive claims about values, have trouble defending their doctrine as a 
merely neutral one between different values. They have a hard time to rid their 
political doctrine from a deeper commitment to the value of liberty (Gaus and 
Courtland, 2011). The scope to which individuals ought to be free is subject of fierce 
debate. But all liberals accept that, at least to some extent, individuals ought to be free 
to pursue their own conceptions of the good. That basic position leads to all sorts of 
practical and theoretical problems. I am here concerned with the issue of pluralism 
and how to accommodate a society where people differ in their moral beliefs.  
People in liberal democracies hold different moral convictions. They are 
allowed to make up their own minds about what the good life is and may act upon it 
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within the boundaries of the law. A person develops his own vision of the good, but is 
highly influenced by a wide range of factors such as societal norms, religion, parents, 
education, friends, and political orientation. To have a vision of the good is inherently 
human and people will most likely always differ in their convictions about what the 
good life consists of.  In fact, the freedom to have and act upon one’s own vision of 
the good also fosters pluralism. So liberalism is not only a way to deal with pluralism, 
it is also a facilitator of that pluralism. Liberal democratic societies are, therefore, 
inherently pluralistic. When one looks at modern liberal democratic societies the 
broad diversity of comprehensive moral doctrines citizens adhere to is evident 
(Mason, 2011). One need only to look at the society in which one lives to conclude 
that assumptions about the good life differ widely. Citizens under one body of law 
will have contrary moral commitments due to disparate adherence to diverging 
religious convictions, political doctrines,  conceptions of what gives value to life, and 
so on (Wenar, 2008). These comprehensive doctrines tend to be at odds with each 
other for there are differing assumptions regarding what is right and wrong.  Such 
conflicts might not even be entirely epistemic.  Rawls, for example, believes that 
these conflicts will not be entirely resolved even if all citizens are rational beings 
(Rawls 1996: 59). Liberalism, therefore, starts with the recognition that latent or 
manifested conflict due to diverging moral convictions are an enduring feature of 
modern societies and constitute an inherent problem for political institutions in 
general (Bohman, 1995: 253). There where people live together in freedom there will 
be conflict on the nature of the right and the good. Moral debates are inherent to the 
human condition. 
Liberals all believe that, at least to some extent, individuals should be free to 
act in accordance with their own differing moral convictions. That presents a problem 
for liberal democracy because collective decisions have to be made. Citizens can only 
live under one body of law and therefore moral conflicts somehow have to be 
accommodated. We need answers on the following types of questions:  Should there 
be a national church? Should we allow abortion, gay marriage or stem cell research? 
Which economic policy should we adopt (Wenar, 2008)? We have to answer such 
questions despite the fact that moral convictions among citizens are so disparate. So 
how should liberal democracy deal with this problem? Sole majority rule is not 
sufficient. In liberal democracies the freedom to live in accordance with one’s own 
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moral convictions is not something that ought to be easily restricted by mere majority 
rule.  
 
2.3 Political liberalism’s solution 
Political liberals have tried to offer a solution to this existence of pluralism in liberal 
democratic societies. They stress that the diversity of comprehensive doctrines is not a 
mere historical feature. It is a permanent and inherent feature of the public culture of 
democracy (Rawls, 1996: 36). It is not unreasonable for individuals to adhere to 
different comprehensive doctrines, as long as these meet certain standards of 
reasonableness (Rawls, 1996: 60). That is, even reasonable individuals can come to 
different moral conclusions. Reasonable pluralism, in other words, is a basic fact of 
free societies even with reasonable individuals.     
 Nevertheless, in liberal societies there is a need to live under one law. Political 
power will be exercised and political liberals believe that this power can only be 
exercised if it is legitimate. The exercise of political power is only legitimate when it 
is founded in law. The law, however, can only be legitimate when all reasonable 
citizens, with reasonable conceptions of the good can reasonably be expected to 
endorse it. But that creates legitimacy difficulties in pluralistic societies where people 
have different moral convictions (Wenar, 2008). The task political liberals have set 
for themselves is to create a basic political arrangement that grounds the legitimate 
enforcement of political power by constructing it in such a way that reasonable 
citizens can accept  the exercise of political power even when it is not in line with 
their own moral convictions. So, for instance, when a specific economic policy would 
be enforced that is contrary to the moral belief of a reasonable individual, she would 
still accept its enforcement, political liberals argue, if it is the product of a fair and 
reasonable process. To achieve legitimacy for the exercise of power, political liberals 
try to develop a basic framework that is freestanding from any particular 
comprehensive doctrine (Larmore, 1999: 600).  
 The key to the political liberal project is that it is catered to reasonable 
citizens.  To start, reasonable citizens will and must share the desire to live in a 
mutually beneficial society with fellow citizens under a rule of law that other 
H.G. Steijn Facilitating a Moral Compromise in Plural Liberal Democracies  19 
reasonable citizens can and will accept. They, in other words, want to live under a law 
that is legitimate. They do not want to impose their own comprehensive doctrines on 
others who hold different views, because they accept that fellow reasonable citizens 
can come to different conclusions about what constitutes the good life. Reasonable 
citizens accept that, when it comes to deep issues such as the meaning of life, even 
people of good will are bound to disagree (Wenar, 2008). The framework political 
liberals propagate, therefore, ought to be stripped from attachment to any specific 
moral doctrine and it is a procedural ideal (Larmore, 1990: 358). Their framework is 
based, in other words, on a political conception of justice rather than a deeper 
commitment to a specific understanding of what gives value to life (Waldron, 2004, 
91). It does not mean that the principles of this political conception are themselves by 
definition not moral, but they should be as minimally connected to moral claims as 
possible. This way all reasonable individuals in a political association can share these 
basic political principles (Larmore, 1999: 600).  
A government that acts on the basis of a particular doctrine fails to respect 
individuals as free persons that are capable of following their own life plans based on 
their own reasonable moral convictions. After a century of bloody wars between men 
with diverging comprehensive doctrines, John Locke wrote the following words, 
which characterize the core commitment of political liberals: 
If a Roman Catholic believes that to be really the body of Christ which 
another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a 
Jew do not believe the New Testament to be the Word of God, he does not 
thereby alter anything in men's civil rights. If a heathen doubts of both 
Testaments, he is not therefore to be punished as a pernicious citizen. The 
power of the magistrate and the estates of the people may be equally secure 
whether any man believes these things or not. I readily grant that these 
opinions are false and absurd. But the business of laws is not to provide for 
the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth 
and of every particular man's goods and person (Locke, 1689). 
Political liberals believe that political principles which ground the foundation 
of state action should be neutral1 between controversial ideas of the good (Larmore, 
                                               
1
 One has to be careful to use the term neutral. Because the enforcement of political power is 
neutral in the way that it ought not to be connected to a specific moral doctrine, but this does 
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1990: 341). In other words, states must act neutrally with respect to reasonable 
doctrines about the good. It must act on principles that are minimally connected to 
moral values.  
Political liberals generally place notions of the right as prior to notions of the 
good. But, political liberal rights are also instrumentally valuable.  Those values and 
virtues that support the workings of the principles of right, such as toleration, mutual 
respect and a sense of civic responsibility, can be instrumentally justified for they are 
necessary to upholding a societal structure that protects freedom, moral equality and 
peace. As long as these virtues accommodate a just society they can be propagated 
and endorsed by governments. The issue that then arises is how far one can stretch 
this instrumental justification for incorporating particular values into the basic 
political liberal framework. Can a government demand that its citizens undergo a 
course in civic virtue because virtuous citizens are necessary to protect the political 
liberal framework? Or can this form of training only be justified if one abandons 
political liberal argumentation and moves to a form of liberal perfectionism? 
 
 
2.4 Public reason         
 We have already established that political liberals believe that citizens ought to 
be reasonable. They must share the desire to live in a mutually beneficial society 
guided by rules that are acceptable to all. Political power therefore must be exercised 
legitimately, and the law that guides the application of political power must be neutral 
rather than being attached to any particular comprehensive doctrine. Reasonable 
citizens hold that the enforcement of the law must be acceptable to all. In order to 
secure this, however, citizens must justify their political decisions in a way that 
upholds the principles of neutrality. Wenar summarizes this form of public reason as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                       
not hold that it is neutral in the consequences is has on individuals. A specific policy could be 
neutral in the political liberal sense, but could affect individual A different than individual B. 
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Citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be 
able to justify their decisions on fundamental political issues by reference 
only to public values and public standards (Wenar, 2008). 
So when citizens are contemplating on who to give their vote to for public office, or 
when citizens are actually exercising political power, they must contemplate their 
decisions by abiding to standards of public reason. They must, in other words, appeal 
to public values that all reasonable citizens can accept. They cannot appeal to 
particular comprehensive doctrines, which other reasonable citizens might not share. 
For example, when discussing a fundamental moral issue like abortion, reasonable 
citizens cannot endorse the argument that abortion is against God’s will. They must 
restrict themselves to public reasoning.  
 
 
 
2.5    The case of abortion  
            
The liberal political mission raises an important question: can political principles of 
justice be neutral between conflicting conceptions of the good and can citizens 
exercise public reasoning in fundamental moral cases? Sandel (2005) argues that this 
is not possible. Let us take the case of abortion. Political liberals argue that political 
principles that guide state action demand governments to be neutral between 
reasonable conceptions of the good. It also asks citizens to endorse public reasoning. 
Let’s assume that a moderate form of Christianity is such a reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine. A large group of Christians argue that aborting a fetus is murder for it kills a 
human being and therefore abortion should be forbidden. On the other hand there is a 
group that stresses the argument of choice: “It is my body and I should decide whether 
to abort or not”. A government should act neutrally between these conceptions and 
citizens should only discuss this issue in neutral terms. But there is a problem here: no 
matter what laws are created, one of the two groups will be disadvantaged by them.  
With regards to this discussion, political liberals would argue that the state 
should not choose one moral doctrine over another. Abortion is a moral debate in 
which the state cannot favor one moral argument over another. Women should thus be 
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free to make their own decisions. If a Christian wishes not to abort, then she must 
have the freedom not to abort; if a secular individual wishes to abort, then she also 
must have the freedom to abort. This way the state does not favor one moral argument 
over the other.  
But, as Sandel argues, this is not a valid way to settle the issue. If it is the case 
that the moral status of a fetus is equal to that of a child, then abortion is the same as 
child murder and no political liberal  would argue that the government should allow 
mothers to kill their own children (Sandel, 2010: 296). The moral status of a fetus is 
not a matter of empirical fact. Sandel argues, in other words, that even political 
liberals cannot be neutral in these moral conflicts. It is also not possible for citizens to 
endorse neutral arguments. Ultimately the status of the fetus should be discussed and 
this is inherently a moral discussion, which will always be connected to 
comprehensive doctrines. The debate of the right to abort cannot, that is, be settled in 
a neutral way without appeal to moral or religious doctrines (Sandel, 2005: 226 and 
R.P. George, 1996: 2495). This means that there is no political liberal solution to this 
problem.    
But does Sandel here not misinterpret the position of political liberals? For 
them legitimacy is of primary importance. Political power can only be legitimately 
exercised if all citizens could be reasonably expected to accept it. The democratic 
process can make the exercise of political power legitimate, but only when citizens 
restrict themselves to public reasoning. This holds that they can only address 
fundamental moral questions by referring to public values and public standards. 
Public values are derived from and are based on those principles that constitute the 
political principles of justice which each reasonable citizen can be reasonably 
expected to adhere to. Public standards are also based on those principles of inquiry 
that each reasonable citizen can be expected to adhere to (Wenar, 2008). If there was 
consensus in society on what exactly we categorize as human life, then Sandel fails to 
make the argument. But just looking at modern Western societies, the dispute over the 
moral status of a fetus is evident (Warren, 1973). Trying to solve this matter by 
looking at empirical facts is impossible. The question is what we as a society believe 
that life is. That is a moral question, not a pure empirical one.    
Also, it is my firm belief that there is no such phenomenon as an undisputed 
moral consensus in society. People will always disagree, because they occupy 
different places in our society with different histories and different frameworks 
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through which they perceive the world (Schumpeter, 1979: 292). A common 
consensus over all subjects and moral issues in a free society is thus impossible due to 
the very nature of human existence. And eventually, every issue in a democratic 
society can be traced back to diverging moral commitments. Of course there are 
topics in societies on which there is consensus. Sacrificing children to please a god is 
widely considered as a bad thing in our society. But this does not mean there will 
never be any disagreement about its moral acceptability.2 There will always be a 
political agenda with moral issues on it. So, even if there is consensus on a subject at 
some point, this consensus is only likely to be temporary. There is no such thing as a 
permanently settled debate over moral issues, because our grandchildren, who will 
live in a different time and context than us, may come to different conclusions. The 
primary focus should, thus, not be on settling contemporary issues, but rather on the 
structure by which the accommodation of moral debates is facilitated and where all 
issues might possibly be debated, even if such issues are considered taboo in our time. 
           
 Settling conflicts over issues like abortion, same-sex marriage and stem cell 
research cannot be done in a merely political liberal way. This does not mean there is 
no merit to the task that political liberals have set for themselves (namely, to find a 
way in which a society can construct a framework in which people with different 
moral convictions can live in freedom and peace). Individuals with reasonable 
comprehensive conceptions about the good should, to a large extent, be free to act in 
accordance with their own moral convictions. A state and its citizens that accept this 
have the obligation to respect that all citizens with a reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine should be free to follow their own life paths. However, disregarding moral 
debates is impossible and not a wise thing to do. Citizens must respect a societal 
structure that is acceptable to all reasonable citizens. But this societal structure should 
accommodate and even foster moral debates among its citizens. How can this be 
done? 
Schumpeter’s solution to the lack of a volonté générale is to leave the  
business of politics to the elites and to limit the influence of the masses. The only job 
the people have is to select their representatives. Their voice should be made of 
secondary importance to those who actually have to make the decisions (Schumpeter, 
                                               
2
 Later in this thesis I will touch upon the issue of fundamentalism 
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1979: 311). His solution for conflicting opinions in society, in other words, is less 
democracy rather than more.     
I propose another alternative. Instead of limiting the role of citizens, we should try to 
increase it while facilitating a realization that, in order to achieve a just and tolerant 
society, they should act in accordance with a conception of a  common space. A state, 
therefore, needs to facilitate two basic structures. First, it must provide a flourishing 
public sphere where citizens can and should actively engage in debating moral issues. 
Second, it must stimulate citizens to be active in this public sphere.   
         
 
2.6 The importance of the public sphere 
After centuries of bloody wars over religious matters, a bloody war in North America 
over the issue of slavery and many other waves of cruel bloodshed over moral 
conflicts, one can only appreciate the political liberal quest for a peaceful society. But 
we have arrived at a fundamental problem in liberal democracies. People have 
different moral convictions that cannot be settled independently of deeper moral 
commitments, but citizens still have to live under one body of law. One way of 
reaching a political resolution is to agree upon fair procedures to settle moral matters. 
In the case of abortion a democratic procedure could be a solution, but a democratic 
procedure alone is hardly sufficient. Both sides cannot be reasonably satisfied with the 
justice of a policy or law just because the procedure was a reasonably fair one. Both 
sides connect the full moral legitimacy of the societal framework to a proper 
resolution of the abortion issue (R,P. George, 1996: 2475). Such moral issues run so 
deep, that mere democracy is not enough for the issue touches upon fundamental 
problems between liberal rights—in the case of abortion the right to free choice or the 
right to live—and democracy. There has to be another way in which a society can 
accommodate the resolution of these types of fundamental conflicts.   
  
I believe the quest of the political liberals is an honorable one. They accept the 
fact of pluralism in Western democratic societies and search for a solution to the 
problems this brings with it. The framework they propose as a solution, however, is 
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inadequate. Despite this, however, they do give an insightful theory that offers a 
guideline as to where to look for an adequate solution. When people with different 
comprehensive doctrines are to live together in a democratic society, political liberals 
say, citizens have to adopt a certain role. They have to understand that it is in their 
interest to create a societal framework that is acceptable to other citizens. So in the 
face of moral conflict, citizens have to reason together to reach decisions that are 
mutually acceptable (R.P. Gerogre, 1996: 2503). Citizens, therefore, owe one another 
a justification when they impose a law upon others.  
As we have seen, it is not evident that this can always be done in a neutral 
way. So instead of leaving out moral argumentation, it should be included and 
embraced. Bohman argues that in the face of deep moral conflict the primary goal 
should be to foster an ongoing public consensus. A genuine moral compromise is 
necessary. The only way to reach such a compromise is to allow a plural form of 
public reasoning that allows moral argumentation (Bohman, 1995: 263).  A moral 
compromise is something different than an ordinary compromise. The latter entails 
some form of a tradeoff purely between people with diverging interests. Moral 
compromise, instead, is much harder because it touches upon the very core of 
people’s convictions about the meaning of life, the universe and everything which 
cannot be explained in terms of pure interest. Both types of compromise ask people to 
make concessions, but how is that possible in the case of deeply held moral 
convictions?  
A concession on a moral belief is usually regarded as a loss of individual 
purity. Some would even argue that a compromise on a moral belief is so devastating 
that it destroys the true identity of an individual. Reasonable citizens understand the 
need for freedom, peace and security in order to follow their conceptions of the good. 
Although they have deeply held convictions, in for instance the abortion case, they at 
least have the intention to uphold a just basic structure of society. This does not mean 
they are automatically willing to make a compromise on specific issues, but they are 
at least willing to debate their stances in order to reach a settlement that is reasonable. 
In plural liberal democracies there is no room for fundamentalism, but again, this does 
not mean that even reasonable citizens are able to come to a compromise on all issues. 
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3
 This is a problem that cannot be solved, but what we can do is to try to 
accommodate this problem.  Thus, what we could do is sustain a framework that 
makes it more likely that moral compromise is possible.    
 A high level of participation is an important element in such a framework. 
When people debate their moral differences, it does not guarantee that they will reach 
a compromise on specific policies. But when citizens are able to understand the way 
in which opposed groups or individuals reach their moral standpoints while trying to 
uphold the liberties of others, they are more likely to come to a compromise on how to 
deal with specific moral conflicts. When both camps recognize the need to come to a 
shared understanding and publicly debate their moral differences, the likelihood of a 
possible agreement increases. Respecting the moral convictions of others does not 
mean we should ignore them by trying to create a neutral framework, which has a 
predisposition towards secular and liberal doctrines. It means instead that we should 
truly respect them by letting them into the debate. Rather than suppress moral 
conflicts, they should be facilitated in order to create genuine mutual respect.  
Hence, we need a vibrant public sphere where individuals act as respectful and 
tolerant citizens, as virtuous citizens so to speak. A vibrant public sphere where 
citizens act virtuously towards their fellows and do not exclude any reasonable 
doctrine in advance, excludes as a ground for wielding political power sheer claims of 
authority and majority (R.P. George, 1996: 2504). Contrary to Schumpeter, the lack of 
consensus among citizens does not ask for less commitment towards politics, it asks 
for more. 
Political liberals are right when they stress the importance of a structure that is 
acceptable to all. The need for mutual respect and tolerance in creating a framework 
that respects the freedoms of fellow citizens is evident. But we cannot do that without 
citizens acting civilly in a vibrant public sphere and without respecting the 
endorsement of moral argumentation. The government has the task of educating its 
citizens and facilitating such a vibrant public sphere. This does not guarantee that all 
conflicts will be resolved, but it is the best response to dealing with deep moral 
conflicts. For citizens living under one body of law a democratic procedure alone is 
not enough. Although minority views are to be protected and taken into account in 
                                               
3
 There is big grey area between fundamentalists and reasonable citizens with deeply held convictions 
who are willing to compromise for the sake of peace, security and freedom. 
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contemplating laws and policies, a society inhabited by citizens with the 
understanding of these dynamics offers a more adequate protection.  
To summarize, reasonable citizens will believe that the law must be acceptable 
to all. They will accept that their society and its political framework must respect a 
wide range of liberal rights for individuals. They will accept democracy as a 
mechanism to come to shared decisions, but they will also acknowledge that there can 
be tension between a liberal set of rights and democratic procedure. To ease the 
tension between these two doctrines, we need a vibrant public sphere where 
individuals come together and debate moral conflicts, and can potentially come to a 
shared understanding in mutual respect. 
Complete consensus through deliberation is utopian. We will not reach a real 
consensus in society on all moral matters and maybe not even in any moral matter at 
all. Also, not all individuals will have the communicative capacities to engage in 
public debate. But I believe that a vibrant public sphere can and will increase the 
likelihood of forming a wide consensus.       
 Gutman and Thompson argue that in order to let a deliberative polity succeed, 
citizens need to have basic civic knowledge and skills like, knowledge about political 
systems, world history and economics. They also should have communication skills, a 
certain ability of critical thinking and must at least know how to read and write. It is 
the task of governments to equip citizens with these tools, they argue (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 2004: 35).  A common misconception is that heteronomous people do not 
have the autonomous capacities necessary to deliberate in the public sphere. It turns 
out that they do have those capacities and that they regularly engage in public 
dialogue (Swaine, 2009, 189). Swaine provides empirical evidence that heteronomous 
people, with the exception of pure fundamentalists, are capable of being bound by 
mutual respect towards other citizens. They are also capable of providing accessible 
reasons for their standpoints in a moral debate (Swaine, 2009). Complete autonomy is, 
thus, not a decisive factor in the workings of a healthy public debate. 
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2.7 The Ideal of (Political) Participation     
                  
It is evident that (political) participation4 is of great value in a vibrant public sphere. 
But as Guttmann and Thompson contend, there are differences in how political 
participation could be understood. Civic republicans advocate a political doctrine in 
which political participation is primary. Citizens are expected to gather in assemblies, 
to participate in making collective decisions, and even to fill public offices by lot. 
Deliberative democrats, however, leave more room for representative government and 
value political participation in less stringent institutional terms than civic republicans 
(Guttmann and Thompson, 2000: 177). I want to abstain from choosing sides between 
competing theories of political participation. Instead, I shall elaborate on what level 
and what kind of participation is required if we take a commitment to a vibrant public 
sphere seriously. I begin from the following starting point which I have defended 
above:  
To create moral compromise and uphold basic liberties of citizens we 
need a vibrant public sphere and for citizens to realize that they ought 
to act as good citizens. This means that citizens should understand that 
they have a responsibility towards each other and must uphold a 
political and societal framework that all reasonable citizens can accept. 
They have to seek a public moral compromise through participation 
and deliberation in the public sphere.    
I want to stress that I am concerned with an ideal of participation. I am not stating that 
every citizen must participate in the public sphere. I am merely stating that an ideal 
society is structured in such a way that it facilitates the political participation of its 
citizens. The display of apathy when it comes to participation in society will always 
be a challenge. But there are ways in which we can combat apathy. A far more 
complicated issue is when citizens have moral convictions that run counter to 
participation.  What to do if participation is fundamentally at odds with the moral 
convictions of certain citizens? I elaborate on this question in Part III in the case of 
compulsory attendance during elections.   
                                               
4
 For now I will use the term participation, but later I will narrow the concept of participation down to 
political participation. 
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 It is now time to make my notion of participation in the public sphere more 
concrete. What do I understand with participation in the public sphere? Is there a 
difference between participation and political participation, and how is that difference 
related to democratic procedure? 
 First of all, participation is an active involvement in the public sphere by 
citizens. It is instrumental to upholding a public sphere that facilitates moral 
compromise among citizens. That does not mean that participation is necessarily 
political, but ultimately it indirectly serves a political goal. It turns out that the 
psychological side-effectsof participation in society benefit the forming of a public 
sphere.5  Each act in society that helps to facilitate moral compromise in the public 
sphere is a form of participation. But I want to make a rough distinction between two 
forms of participation in the public sphere: political and social, the latter also being 
indirectly political even if individuals are not aware of it. . 
Both forms, directly or indirectly, serve a political goal.  Political participation 
includes behaviors such as voting, debating in a public forum, writing a letter to a 
representative, and so on. Social participation is more connected to those behaviors 
that are deliberately taken to bind citizens together, apart from a direct political action 
like becoming a member of a political party. A parent that is involved in a school 
board might serve as an example of social participation. This does not serve a direct 
political goal. Nevertheless, social participation is very important to fostering mutual 
respect and tolerance through deliberation and communication among citizens. It also 
directly influences political participation as will become clear in Section 2.8.  As such, 
it  is indispensable to the process of finding political moral compromises in the public 
sphere.  
The distinction between political and social participation should not be seen as 
very sharp, and there is a substantially-sized gray area. For example, when Christian 
churches and mosques organize a structural dialogue between them on a broad range 
of issues, is that a form of social or political participation? That is a tough question, 
but not one I need to answer here. Instead, I am merely interested here in participation 
                                               
5
 In part 2.8 of this paper it will become clear that political and social participation cross-influences 
each other and that it increases future involvement in both spheres. It also facilitates a societal norm, 
which positively influences participatory behavior of others.  
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that clearly single out pure political participation that serves a direct political goal.  
 Citizens can participate politically in various ways. They can engage in  
political action like protesting to defend certain political principals. They can also try 
to get involved in politics themselves by seeking public office. A more common way 
for citizens to influence laws and policies is by voting. By voting they have some 
direct control over certain offices, such as one or more legislative bodies, and also 
some indirect control over other public offices for which citizens are appointed by 
elected officials.  A very direct approach to involving citizens in collective decisions 
is holding referendums.        
  As discussed above, a mere democratic procedure is not enough to 
accommodate moral disputes. We need a true moral compromise, but to reach that 
there needs to be a public debate among citizens. Genuine political participation 
demands more than mere voting. But as we will see in Part 2.8, voting increases 
overall participation and thus also facilitates the forming of a moral compromise.  
 In an ideal world voting in popular elections or referenda would be preceded 
by adequate deliberation and citizens would contemplate their vote thoroughly In 
practice, however, citizens can vote regardless of knowledge or commitment towards 
the public sphere. Elections in our modern societies for many citizens are reduced to a 
mere popularity contest. And although referendums are supposed to be used to settle 
difficult conflicts among citizens, empirical studies show that they are often corrupted 
by sentiments of voters that are freestanding from the actual referendum itself. The 
judgments of voters are highly affected by a wide range of considerations that lie far 
beyond the actual proposition on the ballot (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 199).  
To achieve a sufficient qualitative level of political participation, a multitude 
of strategies is necessary in which also social participation, for reasons stated above, 
must not be ignored.  Voting is still the most important form of political participation 
(B. van Engelen, 2007:23), but it requires skilled understanding and commitment 
towards a free and peaceful society. Voting is more than just showing up at the 
election box and selecting an option on the ballot. If we are truly committed to a free, 
fair and peaceful society with a vibrant public sphere, then we must somehow 
facilitate individuals in contemplating their votes by discussing it with their fellow 
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citizens in the public sphere, short of making contemplation a formal requirement.6 
Hence, we must increase political and social involvement. 
 
 
2.8 The Truths and Myths of Participation in Public Deliberation 
Quality deliberation is thought to have a number of positive democratic 
outcomes, one of which is the facilitation of moral compromise. Delli Carpine, Cook 
and Jacobs have tried to evaluate the empirical research that reflect on the accuracy of 
these presumptions. Although they did not explicitly research the forming of a moral 
compromise, their findings do offer us a detailed view on the effects of participation 
in the deliberative public sphere. One hypothesis they test is whether people who 
participate in public deliberation set aside their win-lose approach and come to 
recognize the interdependence of their fates. These presumptions also hold that their 
decisions will become more informed and deliberation is said to enhance empathy and 
reciprocity between citizens (Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004: 320).       
 Carpini, Cook and Jacobs start with the observation that the research into 
many of these supposed connections is scarce, but that there is enough research to 
draw some rough conclusions. They mostly focus on the American situation, but the 
underlying dynamics can also be applied in the European case. They find that talking 
about public issues is fairly widespread practice among the American public. 
Although ideally participation should be higher, research does show that people, and 
especially people of a younger age, are willing and able to discuss public matters. 
There is also evidence that supports the view that discussion allows members of 
groups to demonstrate and evaluate the willingness of cooperation. This gives them 
the tools to distinguish a common interest. It has been shown that group consensus 
leads up to actual cooperative behavior, which then creates more discussion and more 
consensus (Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004: 324).    
 However, they warn us for the influence of communication among individuals 
as opposed to that of groups. In-group communication can override communication 
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 In part III I will argue that true moral equality holds that every vote is equal, even if it is not 
contemplated thoroughly. 
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between groups, leading to less cooperative behavior. The context in which the 
communication takes place is thus very important for determining a successful 
cooperation in a society. What is a hopeful finding is that citizens who do participate 
in deliberation have a strong sense that the outcome is fair and legitimate, even if they 
substantively disagree with it (Deli Carpini, Cook, Jacobs, 2004: 327). This research 
provides an indication that the forming of a moral compromise is facilitated by 
participation. People who participate are more likely to see a common interest and are 
more likely to view outcomes as legitimate even if they disagree with them.  This 
view has to be nuanced though. Experimental research shows that under suboptimal 
circumstances, deliberation can be potentially pernicious. When people have the 
feeling that the influence of their voice is highly unequal compared to other 
individuals, this can potentially endanger cooperation between individuals. 
 
 
2.9 The problem of Apathy and A Possible Tool to Combat It 
Political apathy is disastrous for the formation of a moral compromise. Of course, not 
every citizen has to participate in the public realm in order to reach some form of a 
moral compromise. But, it should be the goal that at least a significant majority is 
minimally engaged in the formation of the state’s laws and policies, and minimally 
active in the public sphere in order to uphold basic democratic values. Apathy towards 
these activities is growing in Western liberal democracies and this is a grave potential 
danger. If we want to sustain a vibrant public sphere with engaged citizens, the 
growing apathy towards politics, the public sphere and also towards fellow citizens 
should be addressed. In order to combat apathy, we want citizens to participate on two 
levels. First, they should be engaged in the formal process of policy formation. 
Second, they should be engaged in the public debate for the reasons stated above.  
 Most scholars on democracy have a rather narrow understanding of 
participation as merely instrumental behavior to secure personal interest (Dagger, 
1997: 133). Citizens should only participate when they think they can affect policy 
outcomes to advance their own interest. Democracy then becomes just an aggregation 
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of individual interests, a view that is normally called the economic view of 
democracy. Participation can, according to this view, not be forced.  
This is a too simple a characterization of participation both in practice and as a 
normative ideal. One can, for instance, argue that democracy is more than the 
instrumental participation of citizens. Some argue that democracy demands 
widespread participation because it promotes the development of civic and human 
capacities of individuals. The latter is a more substantive program which allows for 
pressuring the participation of individuals. It is, therefore, vulnerable to liberal 
critique because it offers difficulties of justifying the breaching of individual freedom 
due to its substantive claims.  
I believe both of these views are partly right, but both miss the fundamental 
importance of political participation. The primary value of participation is that it 
fosters basic democratic values in a citizen, which is profitable to one’s fellow 
citizens. The promotion or pressuring of participatory behavior in a citizen can be 
instrumentally justified, because it promotes the liberty and equality of their fellow 
citizens. Of course there are instrumental benefits for the citizens themselves, but the 
personal interest to citizens in participating should be explained in terms of sustaining 
a society which is just and peaceful overall and from which they themselves also 
benefit. Only in a just and peaceful society are the liberties of individuals protected 
properly. This requires a moral compromise among citizens that can only be achieved 
by citizens who are committed to a strong and vibrant public sphere. So I am not 
promoting participation on the basis that it develops citizens into good human beings. 
Rather, I promote it as an instrumental tool for securing the fundamental interests of 
all citizens.           
 The reason why I stress that political participation fosters the freedoms of 
fellow citizens is because, as I elaborate upon later, the justification for forcing 
citizens to participate for the sake of their own interests is insufficient. Pressuring 
them to participate in order to foster the liberties of others, however, does offer a 
legitimate justification to force them to engage in some forms of participation, 
including attendance at elections.  
Compulsory attendance during elections has various positive effects on 
political participation. It fosters participation in elections. It creates a societal norm 
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which influences people’s attitudes towards political participation. It creates 
awareness for the responsibilities citizens have when it comes to their role in the 
societal sphere. It increases their political efficacy. It raises turnout during elections 
and it protects certain basic democratic values like effective equal opportunity. All 
these features foster a political structure which facilitates a moral compromise. 
   
 
  
2.10 Psychological effects of compulsory attendance: combating apathy 
  
Apathy, as illustrated above, is one of the main problems of liberal democracies 
(Dagger, 2007: 133). And if we want to uphold an active public sphere where moral 
compromise is facilitated, citizens need to be engaged. There is empirical evidence 
that suggests that compulsory attendance stimulates political participation and 
participation in other social activities as well.     
 In order to show the positive effects of compulsory voting, we first need to 
know why people vote. Rational choice theorists have a great deal of difficulty 
explaining why people vote, as any particular vote practically has no influence (Blais, 
2000: 137). A better alternative to understanding voting is to see it as an expressive 
behavior that comes from deeper commitments individuals have, rather than a 
behavior that has the goal to influence private electoral payoffs (Yakee and Sun: 
2006: 65). This alternative view allows us to look at voting from a broader 
perspective, because it includes psychological theories and variables in explaining 
human behavior. It starts from the assumption that citizens vote for reasons other than 
pure instrumental individual benefits. They vote because they want to participate in 
the public sphere, show support for their own ideal and fulfill their civic duty. But 
when we look at which people show up at the election booth in states that do not have 
compulsory attendance, there is a high positive relation between voting and income, 
education and age (Steijn, Leighly and Owens, 2005: 3). What is the reason for that? 
How come that the elderly, wealthy and highly educated are more likely to vote?  
There is no consensus in the literature as to why this is the case, but there is an 
indication of why some people are more likely to make the effort. Acts of previous 
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voting are a high indicator for future voting behavior (Steijn et al, 2005: 3). Voting is 
a habit, in particular a habit that is passed on by friends and family. It seems that 
individuals who reside in environments of a high social economic status are more 
instilled with participatory norms, in contrast to individuals with a lower social-
economic.         
 One plus side of compulsory voting, even if it is not enforced, is that it 
reminds all citizens that they have a duty to vote. It upholds participatory norms for 
everyone. That signal does not have the same motivational power to participate as 
when your direct environment upholds a participatory norm, but it does help to 
develop a voting habit. Even if a government publicly announces that it will abstain 
from enforcing its compliance laws, the law would still be a signal of a participatory 
norm. Research indicates that states which have a clear and consistent history of not 
prosecuting voters under compulsory voting laws have a higher turnout than states 
which do not have such laws (B. Engelen, 2007: 27). Upholding a social norm by law 
thus has psychological effects. But to make the argument for compulsory voting 
stronger, I have to show that turning up at the election booth and upholding a social 
norm for the duty to vote has a psychological effect that combats political apathy 
more generally and fosters participation in a broader sense.     
Another important psychological variable in predicting political participation 
is feelings of political efficacy:  the stronger feelings of political efficacy, the more 
likely a citizen is to participate. Research provides evidence that voting enhances a 
person’s feelings of political efficacy and that this has a spillover effects to other 
forms of participation (Finkel, 1985: 906).  This means that forced participation in 
voting can have a snowball effect. Once an individual is politically active, she is more 
likely to deliberate with fellow citizens and actively participate in other civic affairs 
(Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004: 320).      
 Some authors are not fully convinced about the effects of compulsory voting 
on participation. Hangarther and his colleagues acknowledge that internalized norms 
are big factors that guide more socially effective outcomes, but that the effect of 
policy makers on inducing such internalized norms is still under researched.  They 
researched a case of compulsory voting in the municipality of Vaud Switzerland, and 
were unable to find strong evidence of a lasting internalization of a participatory norm 
(Hangarther et al 2012: 20).  
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The extent of influence of a compulsory voting law is inevitably related to 
how well the norm is being propagated. If compulsory legislation is highlighted 
during campaig time, for example, it might be much more effective on inculcating the 
importance of participation on citizens. More research is thus certainly necessary in 
this field. But governments who apply compulsory voting policies do set a societal 
norm of participation. If compulsory voting is accompanied with additional structural 
measures that could increase broader political participation, like civic education, I am 
hopeful that governments in a longer period of time can realize effective 
internalization of civic engagement norms. These norms are not integrated in a society 
over night, but demand structural policies over a long period of time.  
 By mandating political participation, compulsory attendance facilitates a form 
of participation in the public sphere. Citizens are influenced by the projected 
participatory norm, they develop voting and participation habits and feelings of 
political efficacy that has spillover effects in other forms of societal participation. 
Compulsory voting is, of course, not a complete solution for the problem of political 
apathy. Additional policies have to be developed and implemented in order to combat 
this phenomenon.  But compulsory attendance is one obvious way of combating 
apathy and, as will be demonstrated in Part III, the most effective way of raising the 
level of political participation. 
 
 
2.11 The liberal critique of forcing political participation 
 
The most principled attack on forcing political participation like compulsory 
attendance is a liberal one, namely, that individuals should not be forced without prior 
consent. Is forcing attendance with voting inconsistent with liberal principles? 
Liberalism is a very broad doctrine which harbors many interpretations on what 
freedom is (J. Waldron, 1987: 131). In the beginning of this thesis (Section 2.1 and 
2,2), I mentioned that, although liberals dispute each other on the conception and 
moral source of their doctrines, they all, one way or another, value individual liberty 
in some way. The burden of proof is, thus, on those who want to restrict individual 
liberty. Infringement of individual freedom should be justified.  
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I acknowledge that forcing citizens to show up at the election booth is an 
infringement on individual liberty. But I believe it is a justified infringement:  
compulsory attendance fosters political, which in turn facilitates moral compromise. 
And the forming of a moral compromise is the best way to sustain a free and peaceful 
society.  
Let us start with a specific interpretation of individual freedom which offers the 
highest hurdle in justifying compulsory attendance:  negative liberty. Berlin famously 
coined the term in the late fifties and describes it as follows: 
   
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes 
with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man 
can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could 
otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men 
beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, as it may be, 
enslaved (Berlin, 1958). 
 
According to the negative idea of freedom, if an individual is restricted in performing 
activities he otherwise would have done, the restrictions should be justified. Simmons 
argues such a justification can only be grounded in individual consent. He argues that 
men are moral individual beings which mean that they are and should be responsible 
for their actions. Restrictions on individual actions can, therefore, only be legitimate if 
the individual has previously consented to them. 
 Simmon’s position is rooted in Locke’s who argued that individuals are free 
and independent creatures who should not  be placed under the will of kings. All 
humans are equal and free by nature, so nobody can be placed under the political will 
of others (Locke, 2009). Thus we can only be restricted by duties and obligations we 
willfully incur.          
 But this cannot be the complete story on justified restrictions. I may not just do 
whatever I like. I cannot just indulge myself in raping, murdering and stealing. There 
are actions I am not allowed to do, or even actions I must perform when confronted 
with situations that necessitate an action from individuals. One can think of saving the 
life of another human being, when there are no big costs or risks involved to that 
individual.  
 Indeed, most liberals believe there are some natural duties and obligations that 
a citizen must perform. Simmons understands these as consisting of a natural duty not 
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to harm other individuals and a duty to help them if necessary (Simmons, 1987: 276). 
One can think, for example, of a prohibition to drive on the left side of the road—at 
least in a country where people drive on the right—because it can endanger the well-
being of others. Even those individuals, who live under a bad government, Simmons 
states, do not have the moral right to disregard such  rules. Natural duties are 
translated into a set of governmental rules and are to be respected as such. This is 
strengthened by the fact that we have a natural duty of justice, which means we have 
to support virtuous institutions that foster general justice (Simmons, 1987: 177). So 
even if governments are bad, but the rules and institutions that force individuals to 
live up to their natural duties are just, we have a natural duty to act in accordance with 
those governmental rules that are the formulation of our natural duties . But other than 
those natural duties, individuals do not have specific duties which they can be forced 
to act upon. Simmons concludes that no political regime in the modern world is 
legitimate for they all force its citizens to incur obligations beyond their natural 
duties.    
 So according to Simmons’ line of thought, if an individual does not explicitly 
consent to a specific duty that is not a natural duty,  she does not have an obligation to 
act upon it. Political participation is not a natural duty, and an individual can therefore 
not be obligated to  do it. For Simmons a legal obligation to participate would be 
illegitimate. Although he believes citizens have an obligation to adhere to natural 
duties that foster basic justice, additional obligations like political participation should 
be previously consented to: 
 
Citizens generally have no special political bonds which require that they obey and 
support the governments of their countries of residence. Most citizens have neither 
political obligations nor ”particularized” political duties (Simmons, 1979: 192). 
 
   
Annabelle Lever explains why those who advocate a negative conception of 
liberty reject the idea of compulsory attendance:  it is at odds with the natural freedom 
of an individual. She first contends that we have a right to vote because we have a 
fundamental interest in political participation when it comes to our own freedom. 
There are two reasons why individuals have an interest in participation. First, it offers 
self-protection against bad governments. Second, we have an interest in developing 
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our capacities as citizens who can act in accordance with the common good. These 
two fundamental interests in political participation are of primary importance to the 
freedom of individuals and that is why liberal defenders of the principle of negative 
freedom want to protect them. But, says Lever, protecting a right of participation is 
something different than forcing its exercise.  
Lever argues that the position of the negative liberal may be wrong, and that 
there can be some kind of a special duty to exercise the right to votebecause of the 
benefit to other citizens. I believe even Simmons could agree with the existence of a 
special duty to vote if it could be demonstrated that voting would somehow benefit 
others. But a moral duty is not immediately a natural duty. Coercing natural duties is 
justifiable, for it protects fundamental freedoms of others; but coercing a special duty 
cannot be justified in the same terms. A natural duty seems to be a set of obligations I 
owe to all other individuals in the world. They are universal duties I owe due to the 
very nature of humanity (Jeske, 2008). Special obligations, however, are moral duties 
I owe to people of a specific group. In this case that group consists of fellow citizens. 
I could owe them special duties, if these duties benefit them. But coercing me to do 
such an action without me consenting to it would lack any justification.  
In the face of bad government people have a fundamental interest in voting. 
That much is clear.  But if individuals choose not to vote, even if it is in their interest, 
can a government then force these citizens? Both Simmons and Lever suggest that this 
is not possible. Citizens do not have a duty to pursue their own interests even if it is a 
vital one (Lever, 2007: 16). But still, even if people would have a duty to follow their 
self-interest, Lever argues, it could not be demonstrated that voting itself would 
enhance this self-interest. 
 
 Imagine a politician whose election would greatly further my personal 
interests. Imagine that I have a duty to follow my interests. Does the government then 
have a justifiable ground to force me to vote? Millions of people go to the election 
booth with national elections in liberal democracies. My vote will not make a 
difference whatsoever according to rational choice theorists. If my interest is bringing 
the politician into office, then my interest is in the outcome of the election. And my 
influence in the outcome is practically nil (T. J. Feddersen, 2004: 99). Hence, I have 
no interest in voting.          
 But even if I would have a direct influence on which candidate is going to be 
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elected for office, then the government would still lack any justification for forcing 
me to vote. Imagine the following fictional scenario. Mister Ford Prefect, a super 
human being born in the region of Betelgeus, can read the minds of all people in the 
world. He knows what everybody is going to vote in a specific national presidential 
election. To his surprise the vote is going to be precisely equal between two 
candidates. Candidate A wants to forbid the use of super powers because ordinary 
citizens are losing their jobs to these super human beings. They do better work for less 
money. Candidate B does not want to forbid the use of super powers, because he 
believes these super beings should have the freedom to use them. Mister Ford Prefect 
really likes his superpowers and would be miserable without them. He thus has a 
fundamental interest in this election and he holds the decisive vote. Can the 
government in this case then force him to go to the election booth?  
Lever would argue that the government cannot. It would be paternalistic to 
force him to vote in order to defend his own interests. Even if we think paternalism is 
justified in matters of life and death, decisions made in democratic regimes are not of 
that sort (A. Lever, 2009: 19). In liberal democratic elections we do not face the 
potential loss of fundamental interest that are matters of life and death. Those risks are 
legitimate and are created via the exercise of the rights of others. In the superpower 
example, the risk that there will be severe restrictions upon the exercise of the 
superpowers of Mister Ford Prefect is legitimate.  In the face of thousands of workless 
people the claim on restricting the use of superpowers is legitimate.7 So all the risks 
that individuals face by the election of a new group of politicians in public office, are 
created via the legitimate and reasonable exercise of the rights of our fellow citizens. 
Compulsory attendance is not justifiable because it illegitimately forces people to act 
upon their own interest. So individuals should have a legal right, but not an obligation 
to vote, liberal critics say. Laws that force citizens to vote are therefore illegitimate.  
It is now clear what the main objection against mandatory voting is. People 
cannot be forced to live up to obligations that are not consented to voluntarily, except 
for those that arise out of natural duties. People have a right to vote because, in the 
face of a government that does not respect the freedoms of legal subjects, they have a 
fundamental interest in replacing it. But the exercise of this right cannot be enforced, 
for it would be paternalistic and at odds with individual freedom.  
                                               
7
 Simmons would not agree. He believes that actual modern liberal democratic regimes lack any 
justification at all, but I will discuss Simmons on the next page. 
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I believe this reasoning is flawed. The primary benefit of forcing attendance is 
not because it fosters people’s own interests so much, as that it is an effective way of 
protecting the fundamental liberties of fellow citizens.  Even if one believes the very 
hard-line notion of negative liberty of Berlin and the consent theory of Simmons, 
there are instrumental justifications for forcing citizens to at least show up at the 
election booth. As we saw in Part 2.3, policies that foster values and virtues that 
support the principles of a peaceful, free and just society can be enforced by 
governments.  Let me demonstrate.  
In the face of clashing moral convictions, neutrality is often impossible. In the 
case of abortion a decision has to be made.  A liberal cannot  say: “Well, just let 
individuals decide for themselves”. If a fetus is a human being, it would be murder 
and that is at odds with our natural duty.  Moral dilemmas like these have to be 
accommodated, even if one thinks forcing individuals without consent is illegitimate. 
I believe the solution is a moral compromise.     
 As defended in this thesis , sustaining a just society with fair procedures and a 
framework that facilitates the forming of moral compromise is beneficial to all.  One 
thus has an interest in sustaining such frameworks, but not solely for selfish reasons. 
Mainly one has a duty to uphold such a system for the benefit of others. I believe a 
just society is a society that fosters moral compromise among its citizens. In order to 
achieve such moral compromise people should be involved in the public realm, for 
example, by voting. But one can still hold that the democratic project is itself at odds 
with liberal freedom. Simmons thinks that a posteriori liberal democratic states lack 
the justification necessary to restrict the freedoms of individuals. Simmons would not 
tolerate a form of compulsory voting.  
Rawls, however, interprets natural duties more broadly than Simmons does. 
He makes a distinction between obligations and natural duties which Simmons later 
criticized. Rawls believed, along with Simmons, that obligations could only arise out 
of a voluntary act of an individual. Natural duties, however, arise independently of 
voluntary acts.  
 
From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of 
justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist 
and apply to us. Everyone has a natural duty to do his part in  the  existing scheme. Each 
is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts (J. Rawls, 1971: 115). 
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Rawls’ natural duty of justice allows more forms of individual obligations towards 
just institutions than Simmons’. For philosophical anarchists like Simmons there can 
be natural duties, but forcing the exercise of natural duties by political authority which 
itself is not consented to is problematic. Rawls gives us a relatively wider range of 
possible obligations that come from natural duties, which can be forced without the 
consent of individuals. We have a natural duty not be cruel; a duty not to harm other 
individuals; a duty to help one another; a duty to comply with just institutions; and a 
duty of mutual respect (Rawls, 1971). Political participation is crucial for the 
workings of a just liberal democracy. A policy of compulsory voting fosters such 
participation.  
So would Rawls argue that there is an obligation to participate politically by 
voting for example? Blais says Rawls nowhere explicitly elaborated on this issue and 
in his absence it is difficult to assess to what extent he thinks citizens are obligated to 
participate (Blais, 2010: 2). But as we will see in the next part of this thesis, Lijphart 
argued that voluntary voting, as enacted today, gravely corrupts the fundamentals of 
democracy itself. I believe Rawls would not refute the idea of compulsory attendance 
at the voting booth, if it could be shown that it saves democratic regimes from skewed 
and unequal turnout.  
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Part III 
Compulsory Voting: Lijphart’s Defense of Compulsory 
Attendance and Some Concerns 
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3.1 The second argument for compulsory attendance 
   
I believe that compulsory voting is not at odds with liberal principles, depending on 
which conception of individual liberty one holds and which structures and facilitators 
one believes are necessary to protect that freedom. Furthermore, there are a multitude 
of justifications for compulsory voting available.  One important one among these, as 
I have indicated, is that it can be justified instrumentally because it fosters political 
participation. And political participation is needed in order to facilitate a moral 
compromise among citizens, which is a prerequisite for a free and democratic society 
for all. But to make the case for compulsory voting stronger I shall also defend it by 
endorsing one important other argument as well that has been made by Lijphart, 
namely, that compulsory voting is to be considered as an effective and necessary 
practical solution for fundamental problems in liberal democracies.  
Lijphart has made a powerful argument in favor of compulsory attendance, 
and it is somewhat connected to the first instrumental justification. He believes 
compulsory attendance policies uphold one of the most important values of a liberal 
democracy, namely moral equality between citizens.  There are three kinds of 
objections that can be raised from a liberal perspective that I did not discuss in Part II. 
First, there are practical objections that the policy of compulsory voting has a bulk of 
unwanted effects concerning its application. Second, there are more normative 
objections that stress that the effects of compulsory voting policies make elections and 
government illegitimate because citizens do not cast sincere votes. Third, the 
argument is made that compulsory voting does not solve the underlying problems of 
apathy and therefore does not justify the breach of individual freedom.  I believe all 
objections can be dealt with, even from a liberal perspective. 
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3.2 Lijphart’s  argument in favor of Compulsory Attendance 
 
Before I elaborate on the pros and cons of compulsory attendance, I first want to 
define what it entails.  In the literature, the debate is usually dubbed as the issue of 
compulsory voting. But that name, I believe, is misleading.8 In this thesis I have 
referred to compulsory attendance to avoid misconception.    
 Any analysis of this issue cannot avoid what some have called the key paper 
that sparked the contemporary debate over compulsory attendance, namely Arendt 
Lijphart’s paper from 1997 called “Unequal Participation” (Lever, 2010: 898). It is 
the strongest argument available for defending compulsory voting. 9  Lijphart 
combined convincing empirical evidence with an argument for equal participation, 
which has since formed the basis of the debate over compulsory voting. If there is one 
argument that is put forth by defenders of compulsory voting, it is Lijphart’s argument 
that compulsory voting facilitates moral equality. It is by far the strongest, yet highly 
contested, justification for compulsory voting policies.       
Lijphart (1997) starts with an empirical observation.  Empirical research 
unequivocally shows that voter turnout in liberal democracies is not only low, but is 
also hugely unequal (Lijphart, 1997: 3). Several empirical studies show strong 
evidence that there is a great discrepancy between the democratic ideal of equal 
participation and the actual voting behavior of individuals in western liberal 
democracies. Voter turnout shows a strong positive connection to socio-economic 
status. The higher a citizenis on the social ladder, the more likely she is to cast a vote. 
Second, socio-economic status is strongly correlated to the left-right dimension. The 
higher a citizen is on the social ladder, the more likely she is to cast a vote on a right 
of center party. Furthermore, governmental policies that are implemented show a 
direct connection to the level of voter turnout. This means that when turnout is low, 
governmental policies are more likely to be right of center.  
For Lijphart, however, the most shocking evidence about elections is without a 
doubt the following. In 1995, Pacek and Radcliff wrote an article in which they 
analyzed all elections between 1950 and 1995 of nineteen industrial liberal 
democracies. They found that every one percent increase in voter turnout lead to a 
one-third of a percentage increase in the left’s share of the total vote (Pacek and 
                                               
8
 This will become clear in the remainder of the paragraph. 
9
 This argument is closely related to the first defense, but offers a different justification.  
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Radcliff, 1995). Lijphart calls this result extremely damaging for the concept of 
representative democracy (Lijphart, 1997: 4). De facto, liberal democracies sustain a 
voting pattern that is at odds with the very concept of what it is to be a liberal 
democracy. The very core premise of democracy holds that citizens should have 
effective equal opportunities to participate in collective decisions (Dahl, 1998: 38). To 
have a formal opportunity is something different than to have an effective 
opportunity. In Part II we saw that an environment which upholds a participatory 
norm and individual political efficacy are explanatory factors in predicting the 
likelihood of someone casting a vote. If an individual is not exposed to such 
environmental factors, one could argue that his effective opportunity to vote is 
lacking.            
  Lijphart suggests that it is of primary importance that liberal democracies fix 
this highly undemocratic tendency of low and unequal turnout.  He is convinced that 
empirical evidence shows that only one institutional mechanism can guarantee a high 
turnout: compulsory voting (Lijphart, 1997: 10). And what can be more democratic 
than when participation through voting is equal among all citizens?  
 Lijphart acknowledges that compulsory voting will not entirely narrows the 
discrepancy between the ideal of participation and equal influence in governmental 
policy. But, he argues, it is the task of liberal democracies to foster a near-universal 
use of the right to vote if it is live up to the liberal democratic ideal. Compulsory 
voting is only a partial, but nevertheless important and indispensable solution. I agree 
with Lijphart that it will not completely solve the underlying problems of apathy, but 
the psychological effects of voting do offer a quite simple and effective first tool in 
our battle against apathy and unequal participation.     
  The problem with Lijphart’s article is that it does not offer us a fully 
developed idea of compulsory voting. In what form should compulsory voting be 
implemented and what does compulsory voting really entail? It is evident, I believe, 
that compulsory voting is not a clear-cut idea. So we first have to develop a concept of 
compulsory voting in order to defend it.     
Lijphart gives us a very important distinction as a baseline from which we can 
start thinking about how compulsory voting should be applied. He is mainly 
concerned with the fundamental idea of equal influence in governmental policy. In 
order to facilitate this he wants to raise turnout levels. Compulsory voting is a tool to 
increase turnout and although we saw that it has a wide range of possible positive side 
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effects that foster the democratic ideal of full participation, Lijphart’s purpose is not 
to coerce individuals to cast a valid vote (Lijphart, 1997: 11). He wants to uphold the 
idea that citizens have a right not to vote, by  giving them a blank option on the ballot. 
Although his underlying commitment is to fix the gap between the democratic ideal 
and actual political participation, compulsory voting is merely a tool that is 
instrumentally used to increase turnout levels, without coercing actual participation 
itself.   
Bart Engelen has argued in response to Lijphart’s article that the term 
compulsory voting is misleading. Instead, so he argues, Lijphart’s tool for increasing 
turnout should be called compulsory attendance. This captures the basic idea of 
Lijphart more adequately (B. Engelen, 2009: 218). From now on I shall refer to the 
idea of compulsory attendance rather than compulsory voting, because I shall defend a 
policy of compulsion to show up at the election box, rather than a policy of 
compulsion to actually vote.         
 In terms of compulsory attendance, Lijphart’s argument might be stated as 
follows. Political participation is crucial to the function of liberal democracies, but it 
is very unequally distributed among different individuals. It is very important that 
individuals participate in an equal way for if it is not equal, the wielding of political 
power can be highly biased and render political regimes morally illegitimate. Since 
voting is the most important form of political participation, governments should 
facilitate high turnout levels to secure the legitimacy of political regimes. By making 
attendance compulsory, these turnout levels can be guaranteed.  Citizens, however, 
remain free to abstain from stating a preference on their ballots.  
Later on, I shall illustrate a link between compulsory attendance and actual 
voting. So although voting is not mandatory, I believe raising attendance also raises 
the casting of actual votes. But, as the liberal critique goes, it also produces votes that 
are not sincere. 
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3.3 Normative Objection: Forced Participation Will Create Unwanted and 
 Insincere Votes Which Make Governments Illegitimate 
                                 
Some argue that raising turnout levels is not always a good thing. If citizens are 
forced to show up at the election booth, it could raise the number of protest votes, so it 
is argued. When people are genuinely disinterested and don’t have a political opinion 
in politics, they are more likely to cast a donkey vote10 or an invalid vote (Jackman, 
2002). These are practical concerns, but the two underlying concerns are inherently 
principled ones. The first concern is that, if compulsory voting is enacted, then the 
outcome does not reflect the true will of the electorate. If voting is anything, it is 
getting a result that is truly desired. The second concern is that people cannot display 
a preference if there really is not one. Why should we force an individual to vote if he 
does not have a reason to place candidate A over candidate B?  
The empirical support for these concerns is hard to find (Engelen, 2007: 28). 
We cannot empirically distinguish between votes that are the product of apathy like 
donkey votes and truly contemplated votes that reflect considered preferences. 
Citizens who are obliged to vote might randomly choose a candidate or party, but 
researching that question properly is hard, if not impossible. More research is needed 
in order to get the effect of the uninterested vote clearer, but skepticism about the 
possibility of doing so is not misplaced. Empirical evidence, however, does show that 
when compulsory voting is abolished in countries where it used to be enacted, the 
percentage of invalid votes only slightly decreases (Engelen, 2007: 28). This suggests 
that, when it comes to invalid votes, states with compulsory laws do not significantly 
perform worse.    
There is also another outcome effect that is evident with compulsory attendance. 
As we saw earlier on, turnout levels are directly correlated with policy outcomes. 
When turnout is higher, a higher percentage of the votes go to the political left 
(Lijphart, 1977: 5). Abstention is more common in lower social classes, and those 
classes are more likely to vote for the left. And this effect, as we elaborated on in the 
beginning of Part III, is not small.  
So, compulsory voting does have an effect on the outcomes of elections, but in 
order to treat the principled concerns we need to know what the relation between 
                                               
10
 A vote that is casted randomly. Named after the children’s game where a fake tail of a donkey is to 
be pricked at the right place whilst blindfolded. 
H.G. Steijn Facilitating a Moral Compromise in Plural Liberal Democracies  49 
compulsory voting and the outcome is. The real question is thus if the outcome of 
elections with compulsory voting laws reflects the political preferences of the people. 
The empirical research Lijphart presents us, gives no reason to think there is a 
discrepancy between people’s preferences and outcomes (ignoring of course, the 
intensity of people’s preferences). Lower social classes are more likely to vote for the 
left in states where voting is voluntary. The percentage of people actually voting is 
lower for people who reside in those social lower classes. Thus it seems to be a 
question of apathy instead of actual political preferences that is keeping voters from 
the voting booths. The evidence does not give us a clear cut answer of the precise 
effect of compulsory voting, but the little research there is does not seem to favor the 
view that there is a massive discrepancy between preferences and voting behavior 
(Hill, 2011: 30). More research is needed to get the relation between compulsory 
voting and election outcomes clear.  
Although empirical evidence seems to favor the view that compulsory voting 
does not distort the outcome of elections, let us assume for the sake of argument that 
there is a donkey voting effect due to apathy. Is forcing apathetic citizens to vote then 
problematic for the legitimacy of the outcome? Well, donkey voting does distort the 
outcome in the sense that the outcome would not represent the true preferences of the 
people. But it would not endanger the legitimacy of the outcome. Every vote has an 
equal moral weight and that is also true for the vote that is cast out of apathy. Why 
should the vote of a driven citizen have more moral weight than the vote of an 
apathetic citizen?  
If a citizen is not interested in voting, which is the most important form of 
political participation, he or she is lacking in her duty as a citizen. But, an uninterested 
citizen can also be seen as a failure of democracy. I believe the apathy vote should be 
seen as a form of protest vote in the sense that the citizen feels disconnected from the 
democratic polity. Instead of shutting out the apathy vote, we should include it in our 
system. On a very small scale the apathy vote is not a practical problem for it does not 
negatively affect the outcome of elections, but there are very good reasons why we 
should adopt a policy of compulsory attendance. Compulsory attendance will not only 
help to combat the issue of civil apathy, but the form of compulsory voting I shall 
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endorse will also shut out the supposed negative effects of apathy11 on the outcome of 
elections.    
Citizens are brought to the election booth. They are obliged to go into the booth, 
but what they do there is their concern. If they want to waste their vote, then that is 
their choice. They do not even have to cast a legal vote. And because invalid votes do 
not count as cast votes, they do not undermine the legitimacy of the outcome. Only 
when invalid votes are cast on a very broad scale could they pose a problem, but this 
is not the case in any of the countries which have adopted compulsory voting. Only 
when citizens would cast a vote randomly on a broad scale it could form a problem, 
because it would seem citizens state their preferences, while it possibly is not a true 
preference, a critique would argue.  
But there are solutions for this supposed phenomenon of random voting due to 
apathy. We have to build a very small hurdle in the process of voting. If an individual 
shows up at the election booth, she has to state her name. This then will be checked 
and she should receive the following question: “Do you have any interest in voting”? 
There should be two options. If she says no, she then may leave immediately. But we 
must adopt a small hurdle for if she answers yes. This can be a waiting process of two 
minutes or filling in a questionnaire or any other small hurdle. An individual who 
genuinely is apathetic towards voting will leave immediately. Those who only have 
the slightest interest in voting will take the hurdle. The trouble of getting to the 
election booth by far outweighs the passing of that small hurdle. A two minute 
waiting period or the filling in of a small questionnaire is only a very small effort 
compared to going to the election booth. If they already have to show up at the 
election booth, then why not make that extra almost negligible effort?  
If one takes the hurdle and still randomly chooses to select a candidate, then we 
cannot say it is out of pure apathy. There are authors who claim that turning up at an 
election booth actually increases political interest and fosters the acquisition of 
political information, as I elaborated on in Section 2.8 (S. Jackman, 2002). So apathy 
does not have to be a problem in making attendance compulsory, but such 
compulsory attendance does help combating apathy by increasing civil engagement. 
Abstention or filling in a blank box on the ballot should always be options. Not only 
because of the right not to vote, but also to channel protest votes. If a voter truly wants 
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 I want to remind the reader that those apathy effects on voting outcomes do not have any clear 
empirical evidence. 
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to protest against the system, or protest for any other reason, she should have the 
option to make this protest clear.  
Hill suggests that there are many reasons why people do not turn up during 
voluntary elections. These non-voters are potentially a source of information. Protest 
voting is informal. It is either done by not showing up, filling in a blank option on the 
ballot or by marking the ballot with political slogans and thereby invalidating that 
vote (Hill, 2002: 86). One very important voice that is now being silenced in both 
compulsory and voluntary voting is that of protest. Why not try and use that 
information? Hill promotes the view that ballots should have a protest option. Why 
not formalize these protest votes? Give voters the opportunity to fill in a protest 
option and a blank space to give their motivation. Not only will the protester feel 
heard, it will provide states with valuable information (Hill, 2002: 86). 
 
Another critique skeptics of compulsory voting have is that it increases the 
probability of extreme voting. Some authors are afraid that forcing attendance may 
lead individuals who want to protest to vote for extreme alternatives (Engelen, 2007). 
The underlying question is thus if it is better not to include protest votes. Again, 
empirical evidence is inconclusive in these matters. But the normative case is easy to 
refute. Every vote has and should have an equal moral weight. A protest vote is as 
good as any other vote. As Engelen puts it, “Doing away with some votes as worthless 
puts one on the slippery slope to totalitarianism” (Engelen, 2007: 28). But even if 
some would hold that a protest vote is unhealthy for democracies, which of course it 
is not, then one has to ask what is better: to repress civic displeasure, or to bring it to 
light and deal with it? Exposing civic displeasure is the beginning of dealing with it. 
Exposure is, in other words, at least partially a cure. Not wanting to expose civic 
displeasure implies a rather elitist view on democracy. It, namely, implies that 
expressing political sentiments is only for those who are willing to put energy into it.  
 
This line of reasoning is potentially dangerous, because it implies deciding beforehand 
which votes are worthy and which are not. In my view, this is to be firmly opposed, 
because the purpose of democratic elections is not to reflect only the well-considered 
views of involved citizens, but the views of all citizens. We do not value democracy 
because it is the most efficient form of government but because it is based on the 
principle that no vote is less worthy. As every citizen is a subject of his government, 
democracy is everybody’s business (Engelen, 2007: 29). 
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3.4 Practical Objections: Unwanted Effects 
 
Enacting compulsory attendance will have consequences for politicians. If people are 
obliged to turn up at the election booth, it is reasonable to expect that the actual 
percentage of people who will vote rises. This was demonstrated in Part II. 
Individuals must already go through the pain of finding the polling station, so why not 
take the two minutes to cast the vote?  
Some worry that politicians will focus on those individuals who are more 
apathetic towards politics and also less informed, and that this will have negative 
consequences on political debate (Engelen, 2007: 33). The assumption is that these 
more apathetic voters are more likely to be attracted to populism and trivial issues like 
good looks. Compulsory attendance would, therefore, shift the debate from rational 
argumentation towards what these citizens want, namely amusing campaigns and 
sound-bites (Engelen, 2007: 33).  
I do not deny that enacting compulsory attendance could change the electoral 
landscape for politicians somewhat. They would have to focus more on citizens that 
display apathy.  But I do not see any normative or practical problems with this. And to 
be fair, most people who do vote are already quite uninformed and apathetic. It is 
already the core business of politicians, in other words, to appeal to apathetic voters.   
The addition of apathetic voters really does not seem to be of much 
consequence then.  Politicians already have to focus on very large constituencies.  
Political parties in European democracies already take the form of catch-all parties, 
whose sole goal it is to collect as many votes as possible (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 
234). So, political parties do not have a specific ideological program, but try to find 
votes wherever they can be found (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 234). A true cynic can 
even question to what extent parties still reflect sound ideological fundamentals. By 
making attendance compulsory, politicians are merely pressured to increase the scope 
of their already broad focus just a little more. We just add one more group to their 
electorate, namely the extremely apathetic.  I have seen no evidence that the political 
debate of states that enact compulsory attendance are of a lower quality. Belgium, 
Australia, Peru, Italy and Turkey all have their own democratic problems like any 
other liberal democratic country, but none of which I am prone to believe are the 
consequence of compulsory voting. But even if compulsory voting would result in a 
dramatic decline of the quality of political debate, would that be a problem? As stated 
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above, every vote has an equal moral weight even if the vote is just recognition for a 
politician’s nice tush.12  
 
 
 
3.5 Structural Objection: Compulsory Attendance Does Not Solve the 
 Problems It Is Intended for 
                            
In the sections above, I discussed the mixed empirical results concerning the 
psychological effects of compulsory voting and attendance. Where some authors 
claim there is a significant psychological effect, others nuance this supposed effect. 
One could argue that, if compulsory voting is justified in terms of fostering political 
participation and there is no empirical effect on a citizens’ psyche concerning political 
participation, compulsory attendance is not justified.     
 Dagger argues that compulsory voting will not cure all the problems regarding 
political participation. Representative government inherently has a problematic 
relation with its citizens, and compulsory attendance is hardly a beginning in 
addressing this troubled relation. Nevertheless, says Dagger, it is at least some form of 
a beginning (Dagger, 1997: 151).  
 
Compulsory voting13 and compulsory self-registration are promising ways to 
make this beginning because they capture, far more effectively than automatic 
registration or instant direct democracy, the belief that democracy and free 
government do not fall like rain from the sky (Dagger, 1997: 151).  
 
Compulsory voting alone is not the solution to political apathy and we have to 
contemplate other policies as well. In the conclusion of the thesis I will suggest some 
policies that could accompany compulsory voting in battling apathy.  
 I also want to remind the reader that combatting apathy for the sake of 
political participation is not the sole justification of compulsory attendance. Although 
I am explicitly interested in this argument, by far the most powerful justification is 
                                               
12
 This phenomenon supposedly played a huge role in the Dutch voluntary parliamentary elections of 
2002, when Wouter Bos of the Labour Party attracted female votes by simpley having a good tush.    
13
 Although Dagger refers to compulsory voting, he mentions that citizens are not be forced to cast a 
valid ballot. So, he also nuances between actual voting and attendance.  
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that of Lijphart who states that the moral legitimacy of regimes depends on an 
unbiased turnout.  
 
 
 
 
3.6 Abstention from attendance and punishment 
 
Abstention can be divided into two categories, namely abstention on practical grounds 
and abstention on principled grounds.14 With regards to the former, I am referring to a 
broad spectrum of practical reasons why a voter is unable or unwilling to go to the 
voting booth. This type of practical abstention can be intentional, unintentional or the 
product of a given fact due to obvious circumstances. Intentional abstention can be a 
lack of time. There are a lot of business people that work eighty hours a week who 
cannot find the time to go to the voting booth and thus would rather pay the fine. An 
unintentional abstention might, for example, be a voter forgetting that it was election 
day. And abstentions due to objective and obvious reasons are abstentions that are the 
consequence of a force majeure. One can think of an old lady that is not able to go to 
the polling station due to bad psychical health, or an individual who just lost someone 
close and cannot find the energy.  
 All the intentional or unintentional practical reasons for abstaining can be 
addressed. I will not elaborate on every scenario, but will give some practical options 
that could be enacted. If government makes attendance a compulsory duty, it should 
display some flexibility as well. In the case of intentional abstention due to practical 
considerations, like the example of the busy businessmen, the government could and 
should contemplate ways of accommodating these citizens. Why should elections be 
held on one specific day? Why not spread the election out over a week with three 
optional days to vote? This also would accommodate the unintentional abstainer. In 
most liberal democracies, there are other ways of accommodating people who are 
unable to vote. Citizens can mandate other citizens to vote for them. In the case of a 
true force majeur, like a death in the family, citizens can appeal to an eventual 
                                               
14
 I will not discuss the issue of newcomers in a society. There is broad literature on this subject, but it 
is not my aim to elaborate on the question to what extent people should speak the language in order to 
cast a vote. 
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repercussion for abstention by proving that the circumstances prevented them from 
showing up.     
All these aforementioned accommodations, though, produce a whole other set 
of practical concerns: exit polls could influence voting choices; the costs of elections 
would be raised; more volunteers would be needed and a big bureaucracy is needed to 
facilitate, control and execute all the loose ends and repercussions of a compulsory 
attendance policy. I believe these problems are not disastrous. Exit polls can be 
forbidden and additional costs can be incurred. It is just a matter of choice what 
amount of resources one is willing to sacrifice for all the benefits compulsory 
attendance produces. But can one really set a price on the value of democracy itself? 
 But there are alternative ways of voting as well. In most liberal democracies 
citizens residing abroad can already vote by mail. They will have to register 
beforehand, but it is relatively straightforward in most democracies. If one can 
demonstrate the necessity of voting ahead of time, the government can consider 
accommodating this group. Another option for the future could be e-voting. It speaks 
for itself that the time and energy that individuals need for using alternative measures 
should at most be equal to the time and energy needed for regular attendance. This 
also holds true for mandating others to vote for you.     
 One could argue that the government should not be very flexible towards 
intentional abstention. One of the reasons for enacting compulsory voting in the 
beginning of the 20th century was to force employers to let their staff go to the 
election booth. In this light, a busy work schedule is not a sufficient argument for 
abstention. But to what extent the government should accommodate the wishes of 
citizens concerning compulsory attendance is not my aim in this thesis. There are 
ways to accommodate citizens without lightening the burden of compulsory 
attendance. But it all leads up to one question; how much is one willing to pay for 
democracy?    
Principled arguments for abstention are of a different kind. Imagine a citizen 
X, let’s call him Simmons. What if Simmons does not object to forcing the vote 
(which would be an invalid argument considering voting itself is not compulsory), but 
instead objects to the political system as a whole? What if he believes he is 
illegitimately forced to turn up at the election booth? Might he abstain on principled 
grounds?   
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First of all, we should be glad that this individual has contemplated his relation 
towards the state. If he can prove why compulsory attendance goes against the core of 
his moral conscience, I believe we should give him the chance to make his objections. 
But, in order to prove his point, we can ask him to write his objections on paper and 
let him deliver them to a commission who will scrutinize the objections before the 
elections take place. If there are proper objections, the commission can decide to 
tolerate Simmons’ abstention.   
The core question concerning abstention is as follows: if there is no legitimate 
reason for abstention by a citizen, what then is a legitimate punishment? I believe that 
abstention should be treated as an act of civil disobedience. How to punish civil 
disobedience, if at all, deserves a far deeper elaboration than I can offer in this thesis. 
But, there is a complicating factor. Abstention should be prosecuted, for if not, the 
policy of compulsory attendance would have only a marginal effect. Although civil 
disobedience can be justified, in the case of compulsory attendance it cannot be 
tolerated for it would render the policy itself useless. It is not my task to define the 
right punishment, but only to point out that the punishment should exceed the effort of 
going to an election booth for obvious reasons. In most cases a small fine should 
suffice. Structural abstention without proper objection letters should result in a 
heavier punishment.1516 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15
 All liberal democracies hold multiple elections, varying from local to supranational elections and 
everything in between. I shall not delve into the question to which of these elections a policy of 
compulsory attendance should be applied. Most liberal democracies do not have a policy of 
compulsory attendance and therefore could start only with applying it to national elections. When the 
policy is successful it then might be applied to other elections as well. Collective voters fatigue, 
however, is something that must be avoided.   .       
16
 The issue of referenda’s and compulsory attendance deserves a thesis on its own. Due to limited 
space I shall not discuss this matter here. 
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Part IV 
Conclusion: The Future Of Liberal Democracy 
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4. Conclusion 
 
 
Those who are committed to sustaining a free and democratic society have to find a 
way to deal with the issue of pluralism. I believe that solution to be a genuine moral 
compromise.  But in order to let a structure that facilitates such a compromise 
succeed, a high level of participation in the public sphere is necessary. Liberal 
democracies therefore have to develop schemes to facilitate civil participation. 
However, apathy is growing in liberal democracies and as a consequence deliberation 
in, and commitment to, the public sphere is waning. If we do not contemplate and 
implement strategies to combat this decline of participation in the public sphere the 
future of liberal democracy runs the risk of becoming hollowed out. I hope to have 
demonstrated that a policy of compulsory attendance is an effective and justifiable 
way to increase the level of participation. Implementing compulsory attendance alone, 
though, is not sufficient to combat these problems. It is a mere beginning in 
combating apathy, but it is a very simple strategy which I believe does not create 
problems of justification. But to make compulsory attendance more effective 
additional measures have to be taken. Policies of civic education and mandatory civic 
service could be very effective, but are, from a normative perspective, more 
vulnerable to liberal critique. In this thesis I have defended compulsory voting as a 
strategy for sustaining free and fair societies. Policies of civic education and 
mandatory civic service might also be defended from the same line of argumentation, 
but that was not the goal of this thesis. Upholding a sufficient level of participation 
could possibly be the biggest challenge for modern liberal democracies in the 21st 
century. 
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